DEMOCRACY: Conceptions of democracy: the comparison of democracy with other forms of government (7)

Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, Ch. 8, pg. 608

The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests. For all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order. Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as thee are different forms of government. The forms of government are four – democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers.

A Democracy is a form of government under which the citizens distribute the offices of state among themselves by lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualification, under aristocracy one of education. By education I mean that education which is laid down by the law; for it is those who have been loyal to the national institutions that hold office under an aristocracy. These are bound to be looked upon as ‘the best men’, and it is from this fact that this form of government has derived its name (‘the rule of the best’). Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitution in which one man has authority over all. There are two forms of monarchy: kingship, which is limited by prescribed conditions, and ‘tyranny’, which is not limited by anything.

We must also notice the ends which various forms of government pursue, since people choose in practice which actions will lead to the realization of their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. It is clear then, that we must distinguish those particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the ideal of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends. But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it. We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice, and these are determined by the end that inspires them.

Plutarch’s Lives, Solon, pgs. 70-71

Soon, however, becoming sensible of the good that was done, they laid by their grudges, made a public sacrifice, calling it Seisacthea, and chose Solon to new-model and make laws for the commonwealth, giving him the entire power over everything, their magistracies, their assemblies, courts, and councils; that he should appoint the number, times of meeting, and what estate they must have that could be capable of these, and dissolve or continue any of the present constitutions, according to his pleasure.

First, then, he repealed all of Draco’s laws, except those concerning homicide, because they were too severe, and the punishments too great; for death was appointed for almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convicted of idleness were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or an apple to suffer even as villains that committed sacrilege or murder. So that Demades, in after time, was thought to have said very happily, that Draco’s laws were written not with ink but blood; and he, himself, being once asked why he made death the punishment of most offenses, replied, “Small ones deserve that, and I have no higher for the the greater crimes.”

Next, Solon, being willing to continue the magistrates in the hands of the rich men, and yet receive the people into the other part of the government, took an account of the citizen’s estates, and those that were worth five hundred measures of fruit, dry and liquid, he placed in the first rank, calling them Pentacosiomedimni, those that could keep an horse, or were worth three hundred measures, were named Hippada Teluntes, and made the second class; the Zeugitae, that had two hundred measures, were in the third; and all the others were called Thetes, who were not admitted to any office, but could come to the assembly, and act as jurors; which at first seemed nothing, but afterwards was found an enormous privilege, as almost every matter of dispute came before them in this latter capacity. Even in the cases which he assigned to the archon’s cognizance, he allowed an appeal to the courts.

Besides, it is said that he was obscure and ambiguous in the wording of his laws, on purpose to increase the honor of his courts; for since their differences could not be adjusted by the letter, they would have to bring all their causes to the judges, who thus were in a manner masters of the laws. Of this equalization he himself makes mention in this manner:-
“Such power I gave the people as might do,
Abridged not what they had, now lavished new,
Those that were great in wealth and high in place
My counsel likewise kept from all disgrace.
Before them both I held my shield of might,
And let not either touch the other’s right.”

And for the greater security of the weak commons, he gave general liberty of indicting for an act of injury; if any one was beaten , maimed, or suffered any violence, any man that would or was able might prosecute the wrong-doer; intending by this to accustom the citizens, like members of the same body, to resent and be sensible of one another’s injuries. And there is a saying of his agreeable to his law, for, being asked what city was best modelled, “That,” said he, “where those that are not injured try and punish the unjust as just as much as those that are.”

Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1 of Second Part Q. 95. Art. 4, pgs.229-230

Now, in the notion of human law many things are contained, in respect of any of which, human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law to be derived from the law of nature. In this respect positive law is divided into the law of nations and civil law, according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature.

Because to the law of nations belongs those things which are derived from the law of nature as conclusions from premises, for example, just buyings and selling, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in the “Politics”. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.

Secondly, it belongs to the notion of civil law to be ordered to the common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of people who work in a special way for the common good; for example, priests, praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Therefore, certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.

Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state. In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher, one is monarchy, that is, when the state is governed by one; and then we have Royal Ordinances. Another form is aristocracy, that is, government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the Authoritative legal opinions (Responsa Prudentum) and Decrees of the Senate (Senate’s consulta). Another form is oligarchy, that is, government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have Praetorian, also called Honorary, law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called democracy, and there we have Decrees of the Commonalty (Plebiscita). There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, and which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all of these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law “sanctioned by the Lords and Commons.”

Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Question CV, Article 1, Whether the Old Law Enjoined Fitting Precepts Concerning Rulers? pgs. 307-309

We proceed thus to the first article: it would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers.

Objection 1. Because, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says, the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler. But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler. And yet we find in it prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers; first (Exod. 18. 21): “Provide out of all the people wise (Vulg. – able) men,” etc; again (Num. 11. 16): “Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel”; and again (Deut. 1. 13): “Let me have from among you wise and understanding men,” etc. Therefore the law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people.

Obj. 2. Further, “The best gives of the best,” as Plato states. Now the best ordering of a state or any nation is to be ruled by a king, because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, by which God rules the world from the beginning. Therefore, the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed (Deut. 17. 14, 15): “When thou … shalt say: I will set a king over me … thou shall set him,” etc.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Matt. 12. 25: “Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate,” a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings; nor should this have been introduced even by Divine authority, as we read of its being introduced even by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (III Kings 11. 29 seq.).

Obj. 4. Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5. 1, so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites of the Law, such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people, especially since they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in Exod. 23. 8: “You shall not (Vulg. Neither shalt thou) take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just.”

Obj. 5. Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical law; for it is written (I Kings 8. 11): “This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons,” etc. Therefore, the Law made unfitting provision with regard to the institution of rulers.

On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order (Num. 24 5): “How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents, O Israel.” But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard its rulers.

I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government, for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is guarded by all, as is stated in the “Politics.” The point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. For although these differ in kind, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] states, nevertheless the first place is held by the kingdom, where the power of government is vested in one, and aristocracy, which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all, while under him are others having governing powers; and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, that is, government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers.

Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all, so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue; for it is written (Deut. 1. 15) “I took out of your tribes men wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers,” so that there was an element of aristocracy. But it was a democratical government in so far as the rulers were chosen from the people; for it is written (Exod. 18. 21): “Provide out of all the people wise (Vulg., -able) men,” etc; and again, in so far as they were chosen by the people; hence it is written (Deut. 1. 13): “Let me have among you wise (Vulg.,-able) men;” etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law.

Reply Obj. 1. This people were governed under the special care of God: hence it is written (Deut. 7.6): “The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be his peculiar people.” And this is why the Lord reserved to himself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray (Num. 27. 16): “May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude.” Thus by God’s orders Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue, that God “raised…up a savior” for the people, and that “the spirit of the Lord was” in them (Judges 3. 9, 10, 15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people, but reserved this to Himself, as appears from Deut. 17. 15: “Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose.”

Reply Obj. 2. A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man; for “it is only a virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] observes. Now perfect virtue is to be found in few; and the Jews were especially inclined to cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel (I Kings 8. 7): “They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them.”

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